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THE PAVING PRINCIPLE OF GOOD INTENTIONS?
CALLS FOR REFORM OF THE INDIAN GAMING
REGULATORY ACT AND THE PRIVATE
GAME THEORY EQUILIBRIUM
OPPOSING THEM
JOHN C. KUZENSKI,

J.D., PH.D.*

Indian gaming has become a multi-billion dollar industry in the
United States since passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988 (IGRA);' the Act itself was passed by Congress in the wake of
several key and bitterly-fought judicial contests in which the interests
of Indian tribes and states of the union clashed.2 Since that time, the
IGRA has produced a number of public regulatory and private interest organizations in its wake.3 It has also produced a great deal of
controversy over public policymaking, which has, in turn, spurred a
considerable body of professional legal and journalistic literature concerning itself with how-and perhaps more importantly why-the Act
should be amended to be "fairer" to either state governments or the
tribes.4 While the contributions of this literature have been useful for
furthering public debate on issues implicit in Indian gaming, the authors have almost universally felt obligated to begin discussion and
* John C. Kuzenski is Director of Pre-Law Programs and Professor of Political Science at
North Carolina Central University. He earned his J.D with honors from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Georgia.
He may be reached at jkuzenski@nccu.edu.
1. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2008).
2. See infra notes 21, 28, 41 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), http://www.nigc.gov (last
visited Feb. 13, 2008) (The IGRA created the NIGC as the primary federal oversight agency
created by IGRA. It is comprised of a Chairman and two Commissioners, each of whom serves
on a full-time basis for a three-year term. The Chairman is appointed by the President and must
be confirmed by the Senate. The Secretary of the Interior appoints the other two Commissioners. At least two of the three Commissioners must be enrolled members of a federally recognized Indian tribe, and no more than two members may be of the same political party). See also,
The National Indian Gaming Association (NIGA), http://www.indiangaming.org (last visited
Feb. 13, 2008) (NIGA, on the other hand, is the collective political/lobbying arm of over 150
tribes involved with or having interests in casino gambling.).
4. See generally, Brad Jolly, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy of
Termination Continues, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273 (1997) (discussing an analysis of the provisions of
the IGRA, the congressional intent behind it, and a discussion of the contemporary issues pertaining to the IGRA and state desires to regulate Indian gaming).
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criticism of IGRA from the position that there is something profoundly wrong with the way it has shaped public policy.5
In this essay, I seek to review some of the more interesting works in
the area from recent years, the relevant provisions of IGRA, and
some of the paramount cases that have shaped the contemporary Indian gaming debate. After reviewing these materials, I suggest that
they miss the more practical mark of finding an empirically (and legally) satisfying basis from which the two principals in the current debate-Indian tribes and the states-can work cooperatively to
maximize their own interests. Ironically, this basis is not grounded in
dramatic reformation of IGRA. It is instead grounded-borrowing a
few basic principles from classic game theory'-in the idea that IGRA
remains an appropriate and workable legislative response to the tribal-state conflict over the utility of Indian gaming operations. Courts
may be required to continue to provide minor and incremental clarifications to keep the balance between the major players, but the legislation has otherwise "shaken itself out" into a pragmatic framework for
the future. In short, there have been far too many calls in the recent
literature with specifics for how we should change IGRA.7 My argument is that the more compelling issue, which has not yet been adequately addressed, is why we should change it at all.
A

BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN GAMING

Extensive histories of Native American gaming are available from a
number of scholarly articles on the subject,8 so for the purposes of this
paper a more concise history on the background of gaming is provided. This history will allow analysis of the bigger question about
where Indian gaming is heading and why it has become such a contentious political and legal issue. Gregory Elvine-Kries' work in the history of Indian gaming is particularly noteworthy,9 it traces a strong
gaming tradition among Indians back to a time far before Europeans
landed in North America. The games were divided into two types5. See, e.g., Daniel Twetten, Comment: Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act: Could Two Wrongs Ever Be Made Into a Right?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1317
(2000).
6. See Discussion infra pp. 20-21 and note 95.
7. See, e.g., Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, How Congress Can and Should
"Fix" the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Recommendations for Law and Policy Reform, 13

VA.

J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 396 (2006).
8. See e.g., Gregory Elvine-Kreis, The Effect of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on California Native American's Independence, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 179 (1998); Edward P. Sullivan,
Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45

SYRA-

L. REV. 1107 (1995); Nicholas S. Goldin, Casting a New Light on Tribal Casino Gaming:
Why Congress Should Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 798
(1999).
9. Elvine-Kreis, supra note 8, at 179-82.
CUSE
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those of (a) skill and dexterity and (b) chance and gambling-with
both playing important parts in tribal ceremonies or celebrations. 10
With the arrival of European settlers, Elvin-Kries notes, the natives'
agrarian and hunting civilizations were eliminated or modified, whole
tribes were moved to reservations and, in something of a polemical
opening to his article, he concludes that in order to "overcome these
travesties, gaming has evolved into another mechanism used by Native Americans for survival, cultural preservation and replenishing impoverished economies.""

The history of legal gaming in the United States, both Indian and
non-Indian, has been marked by dramatic swings between prohibition
and popularity. 2 "During at least three points in this nation's history,
lawmakers and their constituents have hailed legal gambling as a
magic elixir to relieve economic pressure. After each of these waves of
legalized gambling, extended periods of prohibition have followed
....

3

The last great wave of prohibition, in the 1960s, saw many

forms of gaming prohibited in most, but not all, states."4 In Nevada,
the state legislature decided to rescue and revive the gaming industry
from the perilous clutches of organized crime with the passage of the
Corporate Gaming Act in 1969, which allowed publicly traded corporations, such as major hoteliers, to hold gaming licenses for the first
time in the state's history. 5 In 1976, New Jersey voters authorized
casino gambling in the limited location of Atlantic City, and between
1978-1988, efforts were made in several other states 16 to take advantage of what was quickly and obviously becoming a major alternative
source of state revenue through legalization and taxation of gaming
establishments. In 1988, the stage was set for the "rapid expansion of
casinos and casino-style gaming... [with congressional passage of] the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that defined the relationship
of states to tribes in regulating Indian gaming within their borders."17
Prior to passage of IGRA, the "modern version" of Indian gaming
"dates back only two decades. Its legal roots lie in Florida, where in
1979 the Seminole Tribe opened one of the nation's first high-stakes
10. Elvine-Kreis, supra note 8, at 182-83.
11. Elvine-Kreis, supra note 8, at 183.
12. Goldin, supra note 8, at 805 (quoting 5 West's Encyclopedia of American Law Gaming
129 (1998)).
13. Id.
14. See William R. Eadington, The Economics of Casino Gambling, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 173,
174 (1999).
15. Id. at 175.
16. Florida, New York, Colorado, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts,
among others. Id. at 175-76.
17. Id. at 176.
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bingo parlors on its reservation near Fort Lauderdale."1 8 While Florida allowed limited low-stakes charitable bingo at the time, the Seminole operation was clearly outside the parameters of that type of
operation: the tribe was paying out dramatic jackpots and generating
large profits with the operation. Florida ultimately attempted to shut
it down by using its "Public Law 280" jurisdiction. Public Law 280
was a federal law passed in 1953 as "an attempt at compromise between wholly abandoning the Indians to the states and maintaining
them as federally protected wards."1 9 The law effectively granted to
certain states-including Florida-limited civil and a broader range of
criminal jurisdiction over Indians and their reservations within the
state, while retaining the federal trust status of Indian land. z°
In Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth,z1 the Fifth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals drew a distinction between "criminal/prohibitory" laws, over which states could exercise limited jurisdiction against
tribes, and "civil/regulatory" laws, over which they could not. 2 In the
case of the latter, such laws fell under the ambit of Congress' plenary
power to regulate Indian tribes and reservations as sovereign internal
nations.2 3 Writing for the majority, Judge Lewis Morgan noted that
the crux of the court's rationale was that while the Florida legislature
was ambiguous with respect to whether the regulation of bingo was a
regulatory or prohibitory provision in the law, 4 the language of the
statute nevertheless indicated that the game of bingo was not against
the public policy of the State of Florida per se:
Bingo appears to fall in a category of gambling that the state has chosen to regulate by imposing certain limitations to avoid abuses. Where
the state regulates the operation of bingo halls to prevent ...moneymaking business, the Seminole Indian tribe is not subject to that regulation and cannot be prosecuted for violating the limitations
imposed.

18. Goldin, supra note 8, at 810-11.
19. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535, 537 (1975).
20. Public Law 280 was also notorious for failing to please Indians and the states with respeet to the power-sharing agreement between Congress and the states that it legislated; Indians
themselves saw the continued transferability of their 'sovereign status' between groups of white
men as unconscionable. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian

Law 488-504 (4th ed. 1998).
21. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (Former 5th Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 312-13 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 46 U.S. 373, 390 (1976)).
23. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
24. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (repealed 1991) (repealed by FLA. STAT. § 849.0931 (2008)).
25. Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 314-15.
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Relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent which questioned the
ability of states to tax the proceeds of Indian gaming,2 6 the Fifth
Circuit's
restrictive interpretation of Public Law 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction in the context of tribal gaming profoundly impacted the future of
both legal gambling and Indian economic self-determination. Seminole Tribe expanded a narrow charitable gambling law into a legal
loophole for high-stakes, profit-generating Indian bingo. Following the
Fifth Circuit's lead, at least seven other federal courts upheld the right
of tribes to conduct [gaminf) for profit in other states that barred general commercial gambling.
While the early cases in this vein were largely centered around
bingo and similar types of games, the impetus for casino gaming in
particular emerged with the Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. 8 In that seminal case, the Court
ruled that the regulatory/prohibitory construct was consistent, and in
so ruling found that in "light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually
promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must conclude that
California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and
bingo in particular."2 9 Applying a "balancing test" of state versus tribal interests articulated by earlier decisions, the Court concluded that
"the State's interest in preventing the infiltration of the tribal bingo
enterprises by organized crime does not justify state regulation of the
tribal bingo enterprises in light of the compelling federal and tribal
interests supporting them. State
regulation would impermissibly in30
fringe on tribal government.
In the wake of Cabazon, and in response to increasing pressures
from states to provide for some means of state control over the gaming process, Congress passed IGRA. 3 t The Act also served as a partial response to Indian tribes' request for protection of their federallygranted rights to engage in gaming as a form of economic development. 32 The Act classifies Indian gaming as falling into three potential
categories:
0 Class I-includes "social games" for prizes of limited value and
those games that comprise what could fairly be defined as tradi26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
Goldin, supra note 8, at 812.
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 211-22.
See Jolly, supra note 4 (discussing post-Cabazon congressional action).
Id.
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tional tribal gaming; such games are subject solely to the jurisdiction
of the tribe. 3
" Class II-includes bingo, lotto, punch boards and other bingo-like
games, in addition to card games which are legal within the state
and which are not played against the house (thus excluding the
high-money games of blackjack and baccarat). 34 These games are
regulated by the tribe in conjunction with the NIGC.35 They are
subject to state regulations involving hours of operation, as well as
wagering and pot size limitations, and tribes may conduct them only
if they occur in "a State that permits such gaming for any6 purpose
by any person," which is an admittedly broad limitation.
" Class Ill-includes all other gambling, including high-stakes card
games against the house, casino (table) games, slot machines and
the like.3 7 This class of gaming may be conducted by a tribe only if
licensed to do so "in a State that permits such gaming," subject to
"an allocation of regulatory authority between the state and tribe
set forth in a tribal-state compact. '' 38 The compact may "provide
for enforcement of agreed rules and regulations . . . tribal taxes
equal to those3 9of the state, and procedural remedies for breach of
the compact.",
It is fair to say that neither states nor Indian tribes were completely
happy with IGRA once it was enacted. While both principals in the
conflict received some of the policy positions they favored, neither
obtained the bulk of what they had hoped to receive from it. A host
of legal squabbles ensued. In particular, a number of states were distressed by a perceived Eleventh Amendment violation written into
the IGRA which subjected them to suit in federal court by tribes for
failure to negotiate "in good faith" ° with the tribes to arrive at a
workable compact. The situation resulted in a further Supreme Court
determination-in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Floridan-thatCongress cannot use powers derived from either the Interstate Commerce
Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause of the constitution, to abrogate state sovereign immunity from lawsuits, as the Eleventh Amendment provides.42 In so holding, the majority overturned its ruling in a
state sovereign immunity case that was only six years old at the time.4 3
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1) (2008).
25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(a).
25 U.S.C. § 2701.
25 U.S.C. § 2710.
25 U.S.C. § 2703.
25 U.S.C. § 2710.
Getches et al., supra note 20, at 749.
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(A).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 68.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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The Court declared in Seminole Tribe that in overturning the earlier
case:
[W]e reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as
to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation
of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal
Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States. 4
Thus the stage was set, post-Seminole Tribe, for a conflagration to
erupt between states and Indian tribes that ultimately-through the
normal process of judicial review-could only be referred back to the
United States Government. Justice Stevens made this point in his dissent when he said that if both the tribe and the state are entrenched in
their respective positions over the future of gaming on the tribal
reservation,
[T]he maximum sanction that the Court can impose is an order that
refers the controversy to a member of the Executive Branch of the
Government for resolution [under] 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) . . .
[Tihis final disposition is available even though the action against the
State and its governor may not be maintained.4 5
Federal and state courts subsequently muddied the doctrinal waters
even further by ruling that the Secretary of the Interior's approval of a
compact to which the state objected resulted in a contract that was not
valid or binding under the IGRA. 46 A court ruled that the state need
not negotiate a compact that includes certain higher-stakes casinotype games unless those exact games are otherwise allowed by state
law.4 7 Finally, in the case of the compacts already negotiated with
Indian tribes in New Mexico, those compacts are not legally binding
under the state charitable lottery statute, which prohibits casino
gaming. 48
THE CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSY OVER

IGRA

In one of the more in-depth and useful case studies of why the modern debate over IGRA (and the call for its amendment) is such a
bitterly-fought contest between parties, Julian Schriebman has noted
that the boom in Indian gaming "has depended on tight federal and
44. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 72-73.
45. Id. at 99. See also Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism,and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 3-4 (1997).
46. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997).
47. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 41 F. 3d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1994).
48. New Mexico ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995).
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state limits on other forms of gambling. The loosening of restraints on
innovative gambling venues may stifle this boom."4 9 Focusing on the
Mashantucket Pequot Indians of Connecticut and their legendarily lucrative Foxwoods Casino in Ledyard, Connecticut,5 ° Schriebman
notes that the destiny of Indian gaming is:
intertwined with the fate of its non-Indian counterparts for two reasons. First, an increase in non-Indian gaming could jeopardize the Indian gaming boom. Second, because gambling often substantially
affects interstate commerce, non-Indian gaming, like Indian gaming,
involves considerations of the appropriate balance between federal
and state regulatory powers ... State and federal regulation of nonIndian gambling determines the competition that tribal casinos face. 5 1
Among the non-Indian gaming operations that present the most direct threat to the profitability of tribal casinos, the Internet is perhaps
the least well-defined legally. Internet gambling is also the most explosively growth-laden economically, as it allows patrons-albeit admittedly often with house advantages which are significantly higher than
traditional casino operations-to gamble from the comfort of their
own homes, without having to incur travel, lodging, or other related
expenses of visiting an Indian reservation. 52 Internet gambling is in its
infancy at the dawn of the new century. While it is likely to provide
an additional layer of complexity to both Indian and non-Indian gaming policy issues in the future, it is currently not as much of a peril to
Indian casino revenues as is the threat of state legislatures loosening
state regulations to provide for more non-Indian gaming interests to
enter a given state.53 In this regard, Indian casinos may have brought
to the public policy table the seeds of their own fate, since states which
are required to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes for gaming
operations under the IGRA feel a certain amount of pressure to
loosen the restrictions on legal non-Indian gaming within their
jurisdiction.5 4
Understanding this pressure is relatively simple in the form of an
extended syllogism. States which would otherwise not have wished to
have any forms of large-scale gaming within the jurisdiction are preempted by federal law and required to negotiate with Indian tribes
under IGRA to permit gaming nevertheless.5 If the state is recalci49. Julian Schriebman, Developments in Policy: Federal Indian Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 353, 359 (1996).
50. Foxwoods is legendarily lucrative because it is the most profitable single casino in the
Western Hemisphere, regularly grossing over one billion dollars annually. Id. at 361.
51. Id. at 358.
52. Id. at 358-59.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Id. at 358-60.
55. Id. at 356-57.
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trant or refuses to negotiate in good faith," the United States Department of the Interior has power to intervene in favor of the Indian
tribe seeking the compact and dictate a settlement.5 6 States are thus
forced to acquiesce to tribal gaming in some form, 7 because if they
attempt to hold a hard-line position against Indian gaming, they are
likely to get it anyway-and then cannot tax or otherwise derive any
revenue from it. It is logical, therefore, for state legislatures to loosen
restrictions on non-Indian gaming operations from commercial entities which do not benefit from the federal protections afforded Indian
tribes. Non-Indian operations, after all, can be taxed and regulated
through the normal state apparatus. Moving toward the embrace of
non-Indian gaming operations threatens to cut significantly into the
Indian gaming monopoly in many states, and it is one of the few state
actions-absent a tribal-state agreement-of which the "casino
tribes" must take notice. It threatens the monopoly's profit margin,
and therefore is a sufficient weapon wielded by the state to urge tribal
casino interests to the negotiating table. If one must embrace one's
enemy, to put a twist on an old proverb, it is an interest-maximizing
strategy to embrace the enemy of that enemy as well to keep any
party from getting a little too comfortable with their own control of
the politics of the negotiation.
The growth in state lotteries of the mid-to-late 1980s, for example,
originated as a state response to federal grant cutbacks.5 8 As more
neighboring states adopted lotteries, states without them felt pressured to lean toward adoption of such games as a way of stemming the
loss of gaming revenue from among their own residents. 59 Since passage of IGRA and the time of the Seminole Tribe case, states have
accelerated the welcoming of a host of non-Indian, and therefore taxable, gaming into their territories with unprecedented glee.6" Six
states-Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana and Iowanow have non-Indian riverboat casinos and each of the fifty-plus such
entities in those states employs an average of 800 people and generated $3.2 billion in revenues in 2003.61 The number of states allowing
56. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(A).
57. In classic game theory, much less common language, this is what is known as a "use it or
lose it" strategy; in this case, however, it would be more appropriately labeled a "negotiate for it
on favorable terms or you'll get it on their terms" arrangement.
58. See Lacy Maddox and Thad L. Beyle, New Federalism and the 1982 Recession in North
Caroilina, 13 PUBLIUs 65 (1983). See also, inter alia, Jeff Sense, Oregon State Lottery: Executive
Summary, http:www.eou.edu/ogsp/fsp/jdenseOl.doc, Martin Tolchin, States Take Up New Burdens to Pay for 'New Federalism,' NEW YORK TIMES, May 21, 1990.

59. See Laura J. Schiller, The Lottery in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.: Vice or
Victim of the Commercial Speech Doctrine?, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127 (1995).
60. See JobMonkey: Casino Riverboat Jobs at http://www.jobmonkey.comlcasino/html/river
boat casinos.html (2003) (discussing the riverboat casino employment industry).
61. Id.
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riverboat gaming "may increase significantly in the next few years as
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and New York consider legislation permitting gambling aboard their riverboats. '6 2 Not surprisingly,
as evidenced from Figure 1 below, all of these states either have federally recognized tribes within their boundaries or border states which
have federally recognized tribes in them which have initiated some
form of Class III gaming operations under IGRA.6 3
FIGURE 1
STATES WHICH CURRENTLY HAVE FEDERALLY
RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES AND INDIAN
GAMING OPERATIONS
10115S Of
Z 50*M1'1
STAllSuiVAROUS
WM
TIIRAiB. PifSUI,

MIN&I
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n|ASl
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DUUWG
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Source: National Indian Gaming Association (NIGA) Indian Casino Directory, http://www.indiancasinodirectory. org.

In at least one other case study, which focused specifically on the
loss-of-revenue issue from the state's perspective, Gary C. Anders,
Donald Siegel, and Munther Yacoub tested the hypothesis that the
introduction of Indian casinos caused a statistically significant change

62. Id.
63. National Indian Gaming Association Indian Casino Directory, http://www.indiancasino
directory.org. (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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in the formation pattern of Arizona state revenues. 64 Their findings
suggest that Indian casinos divert state funds from taxable to non-taxable (under IGRA) sectors, but the general growth in tax revenue that
states enjoyed during the "boom economy" of the 1990s largely
masked these displacement effects. 65 However, Anders, Siegel and
Yacoub note, "given the trend toward increasing the proportion of
state funds from sales taxes, a diminution in the rate of economic
66
growth could have serious implications for future state budgets.,
The construct Schriebman suggests for understanding the current
status and likely outcomes of the tribal-state compact process is helpful. While he does not specifically frame the major issues in terms of
formal game theory, he uses a form of it to expound upon the likely
resolution of gaming issues in the future.6 7 For example, states that
have been excluded from taxing Indian casinos under IGRA are by no
means helpless to sit back and watch their tax base continue to
erode.68 The "big stick" they wield to bring Indian tribes to the negotiating table is the ability to legalize alternative non-Indian forms of
gambling; it is rational for the tribes to acquiesce to reasonable revenue payments to the state and oversight by state authorities in exchange for a certain degree of protection of their gaming monopoly
within the jurisdiction. 69 This is precisely what happened in the controversy between the Pequots and the State of Connecticut when Connecticut began courting larger commercial casino operators such as
Mirage Resorts in the late 1990s. 71 "Thus the state's legislative power
gives tribes incentives to agree to provide cash payments as long as
other casino gambling in the state is illegal. Tribes will subsequently
to dissuade
use such compacts, which are enforceable in federal court,
71
states from legalizing further off-reservation gambling."
Should this dynamic of state pressure be used to attempt to force
Indian tribes to the bargaining table? Should the federal government
allow Indian gaming in the first place? These are but two of the important unresolved questions that have invited and received critical
attention in the professional literature of the past several years. Various schools of thought are split on the utility of gaming within the
Indian communities of the United States. For example, Elvine-Kreis
writes about the constitutional duty the federal government owes to
64. Gary C. Anders et al., Does Indian Casino Gambling Reduce State Revenues? Evidence
From Arizona, 16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 347 (1998).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Schriebman, supra note 49, at 360.
68. Id. at 360-61.
69. Id. at 361-62.
70. Id. at 360-62.
71. Schreibman, supra note 49, at 362-63.
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Indians as the conquerors and inhabitants of their land, before noting
that legalized gaming "has proven to be a catalyst for social change as
well as for new ideas, which will facilitate the development of Native
American tribes that choose to delve into the world of gaming. [It
has] also been a catalyst for improvements to surrounding non-Native
American communities. '72 His most forceful criticism of IGRA is
that the way IGRA has been written by Congress is "inconsistent with
past court decisions in allowing states to interfere with integral tribal
relations," and that "transferring decisional power to the states was
contradictory to federal law, and the IGRA now needs to be
rectified." 73
This admittedly passionate position is nevertheless a somewhat
standard polemic, beginning with the proposition that the states areand perhaps should be-powerless in controlling gaming operations
contained and conducted within their own borders. Presumably, this
should be the case even where Congress, the source of plenary powers
over Indian tribes, has determined that it is sound federal policy to
allow the states some leverage through the conciliatory provisions of
IGRA. The author's attempt at reconciling the state and tribal interests extends to a recommendation for adoption and ratification of either a federal or a series of state constitutional amendments that
provide for complete Indian autonomy over their own current lands.74
This, however, is an impracticable solution at best.
From the federal perspective alone, the notion of complete Indian
autonomy flies in the face of almost two hundred years of reasonably
stable Supreme Court precedent extending back to Johnson v.
M'Intosh,75 and would create a host of other public policy problems
for the American federal system insofar as there would then be three
constitutionally-recognized, autonomous units of governance: stategovernments, tribal governments and the federal government. States,
too, would be put at a decided disadvantage in such a tripartite system, given the voluminous body of constitutional law and precedent
that constrict and control them but not the Indian tribes. This is
hardly a practical or easily-adaptable construct, despite the strong
case one may otherwise be able to make in favor of the proposition
that Native Americans have often received the short-end of the
American judicial stick over the history of the Republic.
The creation of new federal or state constitutional provisions regarding absolute Indian sovereignty is also one which is not likely to
72.
73.
74.
75.

Elvine-Kreis, supra note 8, at 201-03.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 210.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
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meet with congressional approval, since the members of Congress
must face the voters of their states to protect their re-election opportunities. Non-Indian voters continue to have substantial misgivings
about legalized gambling in their states, as well as the sheer amount of
money Indian casinos rake in on a daily basis. Native Americans, in
76
turn, are a disproportionately small ethnic minority in most states
that have not as yet been able to mount a considerable political lobby
to go on the counter-offensive. 77
The "Indian sovereignty" argument is nevertheless a powerfully appealing basis to argue for an overhaul of IGRA in the tribes' favor
from humanistic, democratic and/or moralistic perspectives. Kathryn
R.L. Rand has joined this camp by suggesting that
sovereignty, rather than net profits, provides the necessary foundation
for assessing whether tribal gaming is successful ...If Indian gaming
strengthens tribal governments, then even modest economic success
may be expected to result in healthier reservation communities, and in
to pursue avenues of ecoincreased likelihood that tribes will be able
78
nomic development outside of gaming.
What Rand does differently-and appreciatively so-from other similar arguments, is to assess the opposition argument carefully, drawing
her own conclusions about the welfare of Indian tribes.79
Addressing recent criticisms of the social impact of Indian gaming
published by the Associated Press (AP) and the Boston Globe, Rand
notes that these stories emphasized that even in the presence of the
alleged panacea of legalized gambling, Indian reservations still suffered from dramatically higher levels of ills such as alcoholism, unemployment and other social ills.8 0 The articles had an immediate and
dramatic impact on policymakers, with numerous Representatives and
Senators characterizing Indian gaming as a corruptible and corrupted
system that did little to nothing to help Indians as IGRA had in76. According to the U.S. Census Bureau Factfinder WWW module at http://factfinder.census.gov/ (follow "People" hyperlink; then follow "Race and Ethnicity" hyperlink; then follow
"Ranking of Population Who Are American Indian or Alaska Native Alone" hyperlink) only
Alaska has over ten percent "Native American and Alaskan Natives" as a proportion of the
total state population. States in which Native Americans make up between five and ten percent
of the population are Arizona, Oklahoma, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota and South
Dakota. Seven other states have Indian populations of between 1.2- 2.3 percent, but they have
comparatively little representation in Congress, save North Carolina. The remaining thirty-six
states have Indian populations of around one percent or less.
77. Notwithstanding the efforts of groups like NIGA to promulgate the "benefits" of Indian
gaming on non-Indian populations and communities that surround their facilities. See http://
www.indiangaming.org (website for the National Indian Gaming Association).
78. Kathryn R. L. Rand, There Are No Pequots On The Plains: Assessing the Success of
Indian Gaming, 5 CHAPMAN L. REV. 47, 49-50 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 53.
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tended.8 The system and the legislation, therefore, had to be dramatically overhauled to curtail the spread of these "social vices" to the
people on whom they had been visited.82 Rand suggests, however,
that this aggregate criticism of Indian gaming overlooks the very real
successes of specific tribes which have allegedly benefited dramatically from the practice. She states, "failing to adequately take into
account the varying circumstances, experiences, and goals of tribes,
critics are able to conclude that ...Indian gaming works for no tribe.
Yet, as the Pequot and the Plains Models demonstrate, such simplistic
assessments of tribal gaming define success too narrowly. '83 Focusing
on the failures of Indian gaming, she concludes, risks "further compromising tribes' abilities to address often dire social conditions on
reservations throughout the United States. '"84
While this may be so, there is also a chicken-and-egg question embedded in Rand's solution that she does not adequately address. To
what extent is the presence of Indian gaming contributing to-or at
least retarding the fight against- the social ills which previously
plagued Native American reservations? For that matter, what might
the collateral effects on surrounding non-Indian communities be, besides the already highly-touted creation of service jobs at the casino
itself?8 5 More significantly, Rand perhaps views IGRA specifically,
and gaming regulation in general, as too much of an exclusive vehicle
for social change and too little as a series of processes laden with difficult questions of electoral politics, constitutionalism and federalism.
This is the entry point for opponents of expanded Indian gamingand of an expanded federal activism in the Indian gaming controversy-to register their objections.
The anti-gaming position is represented in the literature of Nicholas
S. Goldin, who focuses on the lack of oversight and regulation of Indian gaming. The "adverse economic impact of casino gambling exceeds any marginal, short-run economic benefits ....For every dollar
that a community collects from gambling taxes, it must spend at least
three dollars to cover new expenses, including additional police and
criminal justice services, infrastructure repairs, social welfare and ad81. Id. at 55-60.
82. Id. at 55-57.
83. Id. at 59.
84. Id. at 86.
85. NIGA in particular is quick to point out on their website that Indian gaming is responsible for 300,000 total jobs, of which roughly 75% are held by non-Indians; furthermore, IGRA
requires among other things that land taken into trust status on which casinos exist must not be
detrimental to the surrounding community. Indian Gaming Facts, NIGA World Wide Web site at
http://www.indiangaming.org/library/indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml.
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diction counseling services. "86 Goldin maintains that, far "from creating new wealth for a community, a new casino 'cannibalizes the
surrounding economy. By diverting consumer spending from existing
stores and services to the casino floor, the casino shifts existing jobs
instead of creating new ones ....

87

Ultimately, Goldin concludes, a

"workable" compromise can be fashioned by considering both the
states' interest in refusing to expand the reach of casino gambling
within their jurisdictions and tribal interests in pre-existing gaming operations by (1) amending IGRA to limit Class III gaming specifically
to those games that the state allows for commercial profit-generating
purposes, and (2) allowing communities in states that ban commercial
casino gambling to "override" or provide an exemption to the state
restriction if they wish to keep a current gaming operation.88
This proposed solution, however, suffers from the same lack of consideration of political realities as does Rand's. The first proposition,
for instance, puts all of the eggs squarely in the state's regulatory basket and treats Indian tribes no differently from any private commercial gaming operation that wishes to apply to the state for permission
to conduct for-profit casinos. The Cherokee and Choctaw, in effect,
are treated under law no differently than Bally's or MGM/Mirage.
The status of Indian tribes as sovereign dependent nations within the
United States federal legal schema, therefore, is rendered virtually
meaningless. The second proposition would bring about something of
a congressionally mandated "home rule" provision to be imposed
upon the states, regardless of whether their own state legislatures approved. Non-Indian communities adjacent to Indian territory in the
state, in effect, would themselves become semi-sovereign, semi-autonomous "dependent nations" in the limited context of being able to
decide whether they wished to be subject to certain acts of the state
legislature. The implications for state autonomy over its own jurisdiction are immense and problematic; further dilemmas could then be
expected in the broader state legislative context, as challenges to laws
that affect but do not directly address the "special opt-out privileges"
of these communities come to the fore. Other representative selections from the professional literature have suggested and identified in
more detail such dilemmas.89
86. Nicholas S.Goldin, Note, CastingA New Light on Tribal Casino Gaming, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 798 (1999).

87. Id. at 834-35.
88. Id. at 847-48.
89. For detailed discussion of the dilemmas involving the broader state legislative context
and communities adjacent to Indian territories, See Heidi McNeil, Indian Gaming-Prosperity,
Controversy, 872 PLI/CoRP. 139, 141 (1994); Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 205, 248-49 (1997); Tobi Longwitz, Indian Gaming:Making A New Bet
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Still, the call to be attentive to both the economic and non-economic benefits that may accrue to an Indian tribe that is involved with
the gaming industry should not be discarded simply because there are
problems with other dimensions of the issue. Gaming has, for example, contributed to a resurgence of Indian ethnic pride and identity; it
has also contributed to a pronounced new political activism, albeit one
that is usually designed to protect the lucre of the tribe's gambling
operation.90 This raises yet another ancillary question, given the tremendous tax-exempt cash intake that current Indian gaming operations enjoy. The operations are obviously exempt from unilaterally
state-imposed taxation, but should they continue to be exempt from
federal taxation given Congress' seeming power to impose such an obligation? Stephanie Dean has suggested that traditional arguments
against imposing a federal tax on Indian casinos are well-grounded
from paternalistic cultural and pluralistic perspectives, but nevertheless that they do not present any type of constitutional bar against
federal taxation.91 Furthermore, she suggests that federal taxation of
Indian gaming would (1) more evenly distribute current tribal wealth
among tribe members, as federal programs come to the aid of those
Indians who do not benefit directly from their tribe's casino(s); (2)
reduce the threat of backlash from and level the economic playing
field with local non-Indian businesses by neutralizing some or all of
the "unfair tax advantage '9 2 that tribes currently enjoy; and (3) slow
the growth of Indian gaming while nevertheless maintaining its viability as a revenue source for tribes, thus providing continued income to
the tribes while, "reducing some of the negative consequences that
accompany this growth."9 3
While Dean's suggestion is interesting and worthy of continued debate, it is an example of an ancillary lingering question that requires
further discussion of public policy implications. It is ancillary at this
juncture because it deals with a dimension of the Indian casino issuethe relationship of Congress to the Indian tribes-which has not, of
late, been the crux of the controversy surrounding IGRA. The more
significant combat of contemporary times has been between the states
and the Indian tribes, with Congress acting as an intermediary and
trying to keep the peace between these often-battling interests.
On The Legislative And Executive BranchesAfter IGRA's Judicial Bust, 7 GAMING L. REV. 197,
198-99 (2003).
90. Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity,
60 Am. Soc. Rev. 947 (1995).
91. Stephanie Dean, Getting A Piece of the Action: Should The Federal Government Be Able
to Tax Native American Gambling Revenue?, 32 Colum. J. L.& Soc. Prob. 157, 178 (1999).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Viewed in this manner, the debate can be better understood by borrowing a few basic precepts of classic game theory from the social
sciences, which recognizes the interests of both major players in the
"casino gaming" game-the tribes and the states. For example, both
players will seek to maximize their own rational self-interest throughout the process. They will seek overwhelming advantage where their
opponent cannot respond adequately, but will moderate their advantage-seeking through negotiation and compromise where it is believed
the other side has an ability to harm or otherwise retard their progress
toward the goal of the game. Mutual satisfactory benefit will generally be more preferable to the players-from the perspective of fulfilling their interests-than gambling for fulfillment of higher profits at
the risk of losing everything (or more) than they had at the beginning
of the game. Alliances with other principals can turn enemies into
friends, as each player begins to protect the other(s) within the alliance to protect its own interest in the compact.9 4
IGRA and other judicial precedent in this game between tribes and
states represent a stable presence of known norms and rules which the
players have worked to maximize their own interests. Indian tribes
have had the ability to engage in highly profitable gaming operations
protected by these rules, and their status as "sovereign dependent nations" 95 -subject only to the plenary powers of Congress-has also
been preserved. The economic windfalls resulting from gaming operations have clearly produced great socioeconomic advances for many
tribe members. 96 However, to the extent that social ills or vices may
also result within the tribe, Congress retains the power to legislate,
and both the tribal and federal courts retain the power to adjudicate,
on a per se basis.9 7 With respect to complaints, which the state may
levy against the presence of Indian casinos, the IGRA gives both principals the ability-and the incentive-to negotiate with each other
and work out such details to mutual satisfaction.9 8 All the while,
tribes are cognizant of the fact that their interest in stemming competition for the gambling dollar rests with the state legislature regardless
of their federal status. States, in turn, are cognizant of the fact that
94. These are but a few of the major principles of game theory that are applicable to the
Indian gaming controversy, and they are over-simplistically stated for the purposes of readability
in this essay. Game theory has been a highly useful construct in the social sciences for many
years, however, and it is only now beginning to find an appreciable base of support among modern legal scholars. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (Harvard
University Press 1998).
95. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
96.

HARRIET GANSON ET AL., TAX POLICY:

A

PROFILE OF THE INDIAN GAMING INDUSTRY

3 (1998).
97. 41 AM.

JUR.

2D Indians; Native Americans §§ 11, 33 (2007).

98. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3).
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heavy-handed Indian gaming regulatory policy from the state capital
may result in federal preemption, which leaves the state with less control than it had at the beginning of the legislative process.
The dynamic between Indian tribes interested in gaming and the
states in which those operations are based is a highly sensitive but
carefully balanced one which has found a certain equilibrium since
passage of IGRA. This is to be expected with the passage of time, as
the principals in this predominantly two-player game learn not only
the stable rules, but also consider and try to predict how the other
principal will act to benefit from this stability. This behavior can facilitate a cooperative/consensus model of game play which should not be
flippantly modified by either Congress or the courts.
There are two levels of sophistication in learning. One is simply to
forecast how opposing players will play. However, if two people repeatedly play a two person game against each other, they ought to
consider the possibility that their current play may influence the future play of their opponent.
For example, players might think that if they are nice they will be rewarded by their opponent being nice in the future, or that they can
teach their opponent to play a best response to a particular action by
playing that action over and over.99
Stripped of the moralistic, ethnocentric, democratic, and/or "social
ills" rhetoric that permeates the bulk of current literature on the issue,
it thus becomes clearer that the public policy that is fairest to the players in the ongoing Indian gaming debate-not to mention the policy
that is the most practical to implement and the least disruptive of
other elements of the United States' legislative and legal systems-is
to leave IGRA largely alone for the time being, and to urge a certain
amount of judicial restraint with respect to rendering court decisions
that have the potential to alter the current balance of power between
Indian tribes and the states. Native American leaders certainly have
demonstrated their ability to adapt to a stable situation for the good
of their tribes, and the development of the Indian gaming industry
throughout the past two decades indicates that they are perfectly capable of using the advantages of their sovereign status to help and
protect their peoples without much "tweaking" of the rules from Congress. State legislators, too, have demonstrated their expertise in relying on the current rules of the game to create their own agreements
with Indian tribes that satisfy the signatories to the compact. Although both pro-Indian and anti-Indian gaming scholars are well-intentioned, their current advocacy of reforms to change the IGRA's
99. DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE, LEARNING
(1996), http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/Papers/Essay/ESSAY7.htm.
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balance of power have yet to answer the why question from a more
objective and empirical-as opposed to an emotional or moralisticframe of reference.
CONCLUSION: THE

IGRA

IN CURRENT PRACTICE-HALF-BAD
MEANS NOT HALF-BAD

The calls for reform of IGRA have been numerous, and have come
from both pro-tribal and pro-state interests alike in recent years.
Many of the critics who have contributed to the literature on the subject have seemingly overlooked the position that suggests neither revolutionary change to the Act, nor the dramatic problems of judicial
review or federalism-gone-awry, which would accompany a power
shift in the current delicate balance of roles in the game. That position, namely, is to leave the current IGRA largely intact, and to allow
the three principal players in the current legal game to continue to
work toward maximizing their own strategic positions under a known,
established, and at least reasonably stable set of rules and norms.
In classic game theory, the players in a game are to be expected to
maximize their positions under such constructs to maximize their own
self-interest.1"' Dramatic or frequent changes to the rules reduces the
reliability of predicting an opponent's play, and may work to undermine the future pursuit of the goal of maximization of self-interest,
because the new rules must be learned and new strategies adapted to
them. 10 1 In the context of Indian gaming, changes to the rules of the
game which benefit Indian tribes are merely likely to increase the ferocity of state responses in other areas of state-Indian relations, while
changes which benefit states are likely to marginalize- to say nothing
of further impoverishing-Native American communities. Courts attempting to make more sense of or refine case law in the controversy
have often muddied the waters further and developed a series of intraCircuit fractures.'
This has made them, in effect, a voluntary intermittent player whose actions have dramatic consequences in a game
which had otherwise already stabilized between the principals. However, the effects of judicial review are not always necessarily destabilizing, and-this essay should not be read to propose a strict or
100. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 19 (First Harvard University
Press paperback ed. 1998).
101. Id. at 18-19.
102. Compare Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, states have a duty to negotiate
with tribes regarding forms of gambling that are banned by state law), with Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that states need not negotiate with tribes regarding certain forms of gambling if the form of gambling is banned by state
law).
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unyielding form of judicial restraint as such. A few cases, such as
Seminole Tribe, can be helpful in clarifying the rules of the game that
balance the distribution of power between states and tribes. For example, judicial attempts to make more sense out of (for example) the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments have "met with varying degrees of
success."' 3 They have, in fact, produced so many differing opinions,
Congress may ultimately have to step in and take an even more 1active
04
role to bring back together what the courts have torn asunder.
Under the current construct, tribes and states may employ the
known rules of play in this legal and political game to realize their
own limitations, maximize their rational self-interest by wise policy
choices within the boundaries of the competition, and consider seriously the options of cooperation and compromise with the other principal(s) as an attractive strategy to realize their interests. Tribes and
states, for example, are both encouraged and federally authorized
under IGRA to negotiate a compact to realize mutual benefit. Both
parties are armed with a considerable supply of both carrots and sticks
to bring to the negotiating table. Among the bigger sticks for tribes is
the ability to bring an administrative adjudication action before the
Department of the Interior for redress in the face of a state unwilling
to bargain. States have developed a perhaps somewhat undesirable
but effective "counter-stick" in their ability to allow broader non-Indian gaming within their jurisdictions to recoup lost tax revenueswhich simultaneously increase the competitive pressures on Indian
casinos in an otherwise free and fair public gaming market. Both parties have an incentive to negotiate and compromise rather than to
fight, and the potential for a win-win outcome to the game is therefore
maximized. By leaving the IGRA largely alone, except for potentially
minor corrective or cosmetic changes from time to time, Congress also
wins by being able to avoid a politically explosive battle between tribal interests, to whose welfare they are pledged, and state interests, to
whom they owe their own electoral successes.
The ultimate balance of power between states and Indian tribes
under IGRA's current set of rules-and particularly the "negotiation
of compact"' 0 5 provision-encourages these actors to work together
to realize mutual benefit. Tribes may continue to make money
through gaming, which may then be used to promote tribal health,
welfare, and standard-of-living on the reservation. States may discover
a lucrative new revenue source at a time in the history of American
federalism when it is most urgently needed, and perhaps exploit the
103. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1129.
104. Id. at 1129-37.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3).
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presence of casinos even further by developing "niche tourism" in selected parts of the state, as many jurisdictions with Indian gaming
have already done. In spite of the considerable efforts expressed previously in the professional literature, arguing from a variety of enviably appealing normative perspectives, the most practical solution to
the "Indian gaming problem" in the current day may not be major
legislative reform of IGRA after all. The answer instead may be to
solicit and encourage continued negotiation within the context of rules
and norms that the principal players have now internalized and have
begun to master. The current scheme protects the legitimate basic interests of both Indian casinos and states, and it additionally pressures
them to work together to protect those interests, which may be sacrificed if they play the game over-aggressively.
Lawyers and judges, of course, have a long and distinguished history of intervening when rules of law or equity require intervention to
correct what the parties to a conflict cannot resolve for themselves. In
the context of modern Indian gaming under IGRA, however, recent
developments in tribal-state relations and the tribal-state compact
process indicate that the parties have found acceptable, satisfactory,
and profitable quarter with each other. Casino revenues have been
and will continue to be an important part of numerous tribal budgets,
and IGRA directs the use of that income while simultaneously continuing to recognize the claim of Native American tribes to a tempered
right of self-determination. While minor legislative tweaking of the
Act, or judicial tweaking of stare decisis, in this important area of law
may be beneficial in future years, it is not intervention that should be
pursued for the unilateral benefit of states or of Indian gaming interests. Such actions would interrupt a parity that tribal and state leaders
have worked out for themselves under known and stable rules of the
"gaming game." Those rules acquire even more stability, and the players get better at dealing with them-as well as each other-with the
passage of time and an absence of unnecessary intervention. From
whatever grounds we ultimately argue for change in this type of legal
dynamic-moralistic, humanistic, constitutional, paternal and so
forth-more empirical and pragmatic considerations of how the dynamic works suggest that politicians, lawyers, and judges know all too
well that they can bring about rapid legislative and judicial change
through the practice of their craft; the issue of lingering significance is
whether they should do so.
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